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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 6102

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED SPC REPORT ON VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 5856

AS INDICATED REFTTEL, IS HAS NOW CIRCULATED REVISED DRAFT OF ITS
REPORT ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT REVISIONS
AND SUGGESTIONS MADE DURING SPC MEETING OF NOVEMBER 26. TEXT FOLLOWS:
USNATO COMMENTARY AND REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE SEPTTEL. PAPER WILL BE
REVIEWED DURING DECEMBER 17 SPC MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT

VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION IN MBFR

REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT SENIOR LEVEL
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR IS
CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH READS AS

FOLLOWS: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS."

2. IN ADDITION, PARAGRAPH 32 STATES: "THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES."

3. PARAGRAPH 33 STIPULATES THAT "NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS", AND THAT "IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES" APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. IT STATES THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS REQUIRED.

4. WITHIN THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL INPUT FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING OVERT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES AND DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH
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NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. BEGIN BRACKETS (HOW FAR THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREE

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MENTS REQUIRES FURTHER EXAMINATION. IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED.) END BRACKETS OR BEGIN BRACKETS (THE GREATER THE PARTICIPATION BY ALL ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, THE STRONGER WILL BE GENERAL CONFIDENCE IN THESE MEANS. THE ISSUE OF ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN SUCH ANALYSIS REQUIRES STUDY.) END BRACKETS

ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

6. BEGIN BRACKETS (ALTHOUGH MBFR AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT DEPEND CRITICALLY ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) TO MAINTAIN SECURITY UN-DIMINISHED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON SUCH MEASURES SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:) END BRACKETS OR BEGIN BRACKETS (IN ADDITION TO NONINTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEEK OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES), SINCE THEY COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:) END BRACKETS

(A) ENABLING THOSE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE OR NO NATIONAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS;

(B) PROVIDING MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES INVOLVED;

(C) MEETING ALLIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUIREMENTS. OVERT MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PURELY NATIONAL MEANS IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENTS AND IN PUBLIC THAT THE MBFR AGREEMENTS WERE BEING OBSERVED AND THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE DETECTED;

(D) BEING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS IN PROVIDING A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF SECRET

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HIS VIOLATION. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE GATHERED BY SEVERAL NATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN IF GENERATED EXCLUSIVELY BY NATIONAL MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE LIKELY TO BE RELEASABLE THAN NATIONAL EVIDENCE, SINCE THE LATTER IS OFTEN DETECTED OR PRIMARILY EVALUATED THROUGH HIGHLY CLASSIFIED MEANS;

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(E) FILLING GAPS AND RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING
INFORMATION AND SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE
VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;

(F) DETERRING VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY
OF THEIR DETECTION;

(G) INCREASING BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY WARNING TIME,
POSSIBLY THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S
SECURITY WHICH COULD RESULT FROM OVERT VERIFICATION.
THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME CANNOT BE
QUANTIFIED IN EITHER CASE, BUT PARTICULARLY ANY
ADDITIONAL POLITICAL WARNING TIME WOULD BE OF VALUE
IN MANAGING A CRISIS SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

(H) INDICATING WARSAW PACT WILLINGNESS TO BE MORE OPEN
ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THEREBY ENHANCING CONFIDENCE.

RECIPROCITY
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7. ANY NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD
HAVE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. IN GENERAL IT SEEMS UNLIKELY
THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT ON THEIR TERRITORY
ARRANGEMENTS SO INTRUSIVE THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION
WOULD HARM WESTERN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, EACH POSSIBLE NEGOTATED
INSPECTION MEASURE MUST BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER
ITS APPLICATION ON ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.

NON-INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

8. NO OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED
WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN
EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE
AND LEGAL ACTIVITIES OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTORATES IN THE
WESTERN PART OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA WOULD NOT PER SE
CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

POSSIBLE MEASURES OUTSIDE NATO GUIDELINES AREA

9. TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL).

STAFFING OF INSPECTORATES

10. SUBJECT TO FURTHER ALLIED STUDIES, INSPECTORATES IN THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NATIONS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA; FLANK COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY INSPECTORATES WHICH MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION; AND ANY AGREEMENTS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WOULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE ASSIGNING OF ALLIED (INCLUDING HOST COUNTRY) LIAISON OFFICERS TO WARSAW PACT INSPECTION TEAMS ON ALLIED TERRITORY, AND VICE VERSA.

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

11. OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY THE ALLIES SHOULD BE SECRET

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ADMINISTERED BY NATO. POLICY GUIDANCE SHOULD EMANATE FROM THE COUNCIL AND OVERALL TECHNICAL DIRECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

12. THE PRODUCT OF OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

13. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS LINKED TO REDUCTION MEASURES ON WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY AGREED. THEREFORE, SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

14. VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AGREED FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE. SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES (E.G. VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) WOULD NORMALLY EXTEND INTO THE SECOND PHASE.

15. THIS REPORT RECOMMENDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE AND FEASIBLE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION POSSIBILITIES, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FINAL CHOICE OF MEASURES AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH IN ANY OVERALL INSPECTION SCHEME CAN BE DECIDED ONLY AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION DEVELOPS.

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

VERIFICATION OF PRE-REDUCTION FORCES LEVELS AND/OR
PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

16. PROPOSAL OF THIS MEASURE COULD IMPEDE OVERALL PROGRESS
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING EASTERN
AGREEMENT TO OTHER MORE ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THE
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, UNWILLING EVEN TO DISCUSS DATA ON THEIR
PRE-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WILL HARDLY AGREE TO THEIR INSPECTION.
AN ALLIED PROPOSAL TO INSPECT OBSERVANCE OF PRE-REDUCTION
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CONSTRAINTS WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH THEIR NEGOTIABILITY.

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VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS

17. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS IS AN IMPORTANT
ALLIED OBJECTIVE, AND HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ITS
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD INVOLVE THE TEMPORARY STATION-
ING OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO MONITOR
COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS OBJECTIVE
SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO INVOLVE NATO
IN UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS. THESE INSPECTORATES WOULD, IN ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL OF THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ACCURACY IN THE VERIFICATION OF SECRET

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POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN PERSONNEL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE IN BROAD TERMS.

VERIFICATION OF COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES

19. IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANCE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO THE POSSIBLE VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES.

TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT INSPECTION OF WHATEVER STABILISING MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.

IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES

20. ASSESSMENTS IN THIS SECTION WERE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION" IN MBFR (AC/276-WP(73)43(REVISED) OF 30TH NOVEMBER, 1973. THIS DOCUMENT, AS WELL AS THE US PAPER(1) ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IN MBFR" OF 5TH OCTOBER 1973 TO WHICH IT REFERS, ARE AT ANNEX. ADDITIONAL DETAILED TECHNICAL STUDY WILL BE REQUIRED ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES PRIOR TO AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE IN BROAD OUTLINE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TECHNICAL STUDIES.

A. USE OF OBSERVATION POSTS AND MOBILE TEAMS TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS

21. THIS MEASURE WOULD INVOLVE ONE OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE STATIONING OF WESTERN OBSERVERS AT THE ROAD OR RAIL CROSSING POINTS INTO THE USSR BEING USED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL. (SOME 25 MEN AT EACH CROSSING POINT).

(B) IN ADDITION, A NUMBER OF MOBILE TWO-MAN TEAMS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWING UNITS FROM THEIR BARRACKS TO THE CROSSING POINTS.

22. EITHER OF THE ABOVE SYSTEMS EMPLOYED ALONE WOULD
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ENSURE ADEQUATE MONITORING OF THE WITHDRAWALS.

23. THE CHIEF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF MOBILE TEAMS OVER STATIONED OBSERVERS IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE IS THAT ONLY THE FORMER COULD DETERMINE PRECISELY WHICH KINDS AND SIZES OF UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WHAT THE ORDER OF BATTLE HAD BEEN AT PARTICULAR CASERNS, USEFUL INFORMATION FOR POST-REDUCTION ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF MONITORING. ALSO, MOBILE TEAMS ARE MORE FLEXIBLE AND DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT THAN STATIONED OBSERVERS. BOTH SYSTEMS ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND WOULD INVOLVE NATO IN NO UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

24. NEITHER SYSTEM HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DRAWBACKS, AND NEITHER HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER.

25. THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE (A) ABOVE IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE (B) IS MORE QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THE ABOVE-CITED ADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS DISADVANTAGES BY THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING BOTH IS NOT EXCLUDED.

26. CONCLUSION: THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE BOTH (A) AND (B).

B. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS (POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS) TO MONITOR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

27. THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER SUGGESTES A MINIMUM OF 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN EAST GERMANY, 7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND 7 TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN POLAND. HOWEVER, A NATO STUDY(2) HAS ADVOCATED THE MUCH LARGER TOTAL OF 130 TWO-MAN TEAMS BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SUB-HEADQUARTERS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THESE TWO SUGGESTIONS FURTHER STUDY IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S PURELY MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A MAXIMUM DENSITY OF TEAMS. HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON ALLIED TERRITORY FROM A DOMESTIC POLITICAL POINT OF
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VIEW, KEEPING IN MIND THE INDEFINITE DURATION, UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, OF THIS VERIFICATION PROVISION.

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28. DEPENDING ON THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE SUPPLEMENTING THE MOBILE TEAMS WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS(3). HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS ARE GENERALLY PREFERABLE TO FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY; THEY ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT AND REQUIRE FEWER MEN TO STAFF.

29. NONE OF THE ABOVE SYSTEMS (MOBILE TEAMS, STATIC PERIMETER POSTS, CHOKE POINT POSTS) HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES, AND THERE IS NOT PREFERENCE FOR ANY ONE OF THEM FROM A PURELY POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW.

30. MOBILE TEAMS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS, SINCE THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PERCEIVE OF THE FORMER AS MORE DIFFICULT TO DECEIVE AND CIRCUMVENT. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS APPEAR NEGOTIABLE.

31. CONCLUSION: THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE USE OF MO-
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BILE TEAMS AS OUTLINED IN B ABOVE, SUPPLEMENTED BY A SMALL NUMBER OF STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS. IF THIS PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, THEY SHOULD TRY TO NEGOTIATE THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS.

C. USE OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS (MLMS) TO MONITOR AGREED
WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS IN EAST GERMANY

32. THE US, UK AND FRANCE HAVE MLMS IN EAST GERMANY ACCREDITED TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY. THE MLMS CURRENTLY HAVE TWO MISSIONS: (I) TO SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR OWN AND THE SOVIET COMMANDERS IN GERMANY, AND (II) TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN FORCES. UNDER PROPOSAL C ABOVE, THE MLMS WOULD BE GIVEN THE ADDITIONAL AND PRIMARY MISSION OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREEMENTS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. IN THIS CONNECTION AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS IN EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE REMOVED.

33. MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL: MLMS OVER THE YEARS HAVE DEMONSTRATED A HIGH DEGREE OF PRODUCTIVITY, IMAGINATION, AND OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN REPORTING ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON EAST GERMAN TERRITORY. THEY ARE A LARGE (67-MAN), WELL-TRAINED FORCE-IN-BEING WHICH, FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, WOULD BE WELL SUITED TO THE TASK OF OVERT INSPECTION IN MBFR. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY DISADVANTAGES TO THEIR USE.

34. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, VERY PRONOUNCED POLITICAL DIS-ADVANTAGES. THE MLMS WERE ESTABLISHED UNDER POST-WAR AGREEMENT FOR THE VERY LIMITED AND SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF SERVING AS LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR OWN AND THE SOVIET COMMANDERS IN THE SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY. SWITCHING THEIR PRIMARY MISSION TO MBFR INSPECTION WOULD ALTER THEIR BASIC RAISON D'ETRE AND COULD CREATE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE COMPLICATED GERMAN QUESTION. ALSO, THEIR USE IN MBFR INSPECTION MIGHT SIGNIFY A UNIQUE STATUS FOR ALL OF GERMANY IN MBFR AND MARK GERMANY AS A SPECIAL "REDUCTION AREA"

SINCE ONLY THREE ALLIES HAVE MLMS IN EAST GERMANY, THE REMAINING ALLIES WOULD AB INITIO BE EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN MBFR INSPECTION IN THE GDR. MOREOVER, THE USE OF THE FRENCH MLM FOR
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MBFR INSPECTION WOULD BE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE, SINCE FRANCE WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. LASTLY, THE RECIPROCAL GRANTING OF AN INSPECTION ROLE TO THE LARGE SOVIET MLMS IN THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ACCEPTABILITY. QUITE APART FROM THE COMPLEX LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED. IT APPEARS THAT THERE ARE NO POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO THE PROPOSAL.

35. THE NEGOTIATBILITY OF THE PROPOSAL IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATICAL. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT SEE PRACTICAL DISADVANTAGES IN AUGMENTING AND LEGALIZING THE INSPECTION ROLE OF THE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE MLMS IN THIS KEY AREA OF THE CENTRAL REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MIGHT PERCEIVE OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGES IN ALTERING THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE MLMS, THEREBY BLURRING THEIR

ORIGINAL ALL-GERMAN ROLE.

36. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE OF THE OVERRIDING POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES,
THIS MEASURE SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED.

D. USE OF NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES TO MONITOR AGREED
WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

37. IN AN MBFR INSPECTION ROLE, ALLIED NATIONAL ATTACHES
OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT NATIONS IN A GIVEN COUNTRY WOULD WORK AS
A TEAM AND WOULD REPORT TO A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE
TO THE NATO COUNCIL.

38. MILITARY ADVANTAGES: ALLIED ATTACHES IN WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES CONSTITUTE A TRAINED FORCE-IN-BEING WHICH, FROM A
PURELY MILITARY POOINT OF VIEW, WOULD BE WELL SUITED TO THE TASK
OF OVERT INSPECTION IN MBFR.

39. A MAJOR POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE TO THE PROPOSAL IS THAT,
OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT ALLIES, ONLY THREE (CANADA, UK, US)
CURRENTLY HAVE ATTACHES IN THE WARSAW PACT PART OF THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREA. MOREOVER, THERE MIGHT BE SOME OBJECTIONS TO
ALTERING
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHE.

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40. CONCLUSION: BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES MENTIONED
ABOVE, THIS MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED.

E. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

41. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF SENSORS, MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. WARSAW PACT INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD NATO AIRCRAFT (NORMALLY BELONGING TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY), UTILIZE ONLY NATO SENSORS, AND BE ACCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE FLIGHTS WOULD ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR MAXIMUM FLIGHT FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

42. THE MAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER GROUND OBSERVATION LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO COVER LARGE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. A TECHNICAL DRAWBACK
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IN RELATION TO GROUND OBSERVATION IS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF AIRBORNE SYSTEMS TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA BAD WEATHER COULD FREQUENTLY PRECLUDE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY.

43. APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE OVER ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF LIMITED OR DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS SECTION. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT OBJECT TO WARSAW PACT AERIAL INSPECTION OF THEIR TERRITORY ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS TOO ENCOMPASSING AND INTRUSIVE. WHILE GROUND INSPECTORS COULD BE LIMITED LARGELY TO VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH MBFR AGREEMENTS, AERIAL INSPECTORS COULD, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE, GLEAN INTELLIGENCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OVER VERY LARGE AREAS.

44. WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIONS TO NATO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THEIR TERRITORY. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONCERN OF BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THIS MEASURE, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE IF PRESENTED IN A CAREFULLY DEFINED FORM WHICH EMPHASISES ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

45. CONCLUSION: DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADVANCING A CAREFULLY DEFINED "OPEN SKIES" PROPOSAL, THE DETAILS OF WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

46. THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM TO COVER WITHDRAWALS, POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, AND, POSSIBLY, COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES. IT

SHOULD BE A REASONABLY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, SUPPORTED WHERE APPROPRIATE AND FEASIBLE BY SOME STATIC POSTS AND SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. SPECIFICALLY, OF THE MEASURES LISTED IN SECTION IV, THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE HARD FOR A AND B AND CONSIDER PROPOSING E.

FOOTNOTES:

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(1) IT IS ENVISAGED TO ATTACH THOSE PORTIONS OF THE 5TH OCTOBER US PAPER TO WHICH THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT REFERS.

(2) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), PARAGRAPH 27 OF APPENDIX B TO ANNEX.

(E) THESE FIXED POSTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER, PAGES 45-50.

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